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Reforming a World Class Competition Regime: The Government’s Proposal for 
the Creation of a Single Competition and Markets Authority 
James Aitken and Alison Jones
*
 
This is a draft version of an article published in its final form in the Competition Law 
Journal: [2011] Comp Law 97 
Introduction 
The last eleven years have seen dramatic substantive and institutional change to the 
UK competition law regime. In March 2000, the Competition Act of 1998 (CA98) 
brought into force prohibitions against restrictive agreements (the Chapter I 
prohibition) and abuse of dominance (the Chapter II prohibition) modelled on Articles 
101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
1
 The 
Act swept away much of the old law,
2
 but left intact the monopoly and merger 
provisions set out in the Fair Trading Act of 1973 (FTA). On June 20 2003, however, 
the Enterprise Act 2002 (EA) made additional significant alterations to create a „world 
class‟ competition regime:3 modernising, reforming and replacing the FTA monopoly 
and merger regimes; establishing the Office of Fair Trading (OFT);
4
 creating the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT);
5
 and introducing measures to supplement, the 
CA98 – in particular, a new criminal offence for individuals who dishonestly engage 
in cartel agreements, a new power to disqualify directors of companies that have 
breached the competition rules, and rules designed to enable individuals to obtain 
redress when injured by anticompetitive behaviour. Subsequently, in 2004, further 
reform to the system was introduced following the „modernisation‟ of EU competition 
law.
6
 Although the prohibitions set out in Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU had always 
 
*
  James Aitken is a partner at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP. Alison Jones is a Professor of 
Law at King‟s College London and a solicitor at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP. The authors 
would like to thank Margaret Bloom for her helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The 
views set out in this document are personal and do not reflect the view of Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer LLP. 
1
  To be interpreted, in so far as is possible, consistently with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, CA98, s 
60. 
2  The CA98 repealed the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1976, the Resale Prices Act of 1976 and 
most of the Competition Act of 1980. It also established the Competition Commission (CC), 
CA98, s 45. 
3 The Act received Royal Assent on November 7, 2002. Although some provisions were brought 
into effect by statutory instrument on April 1, 2003 nearly all the substantive provisions came into 
effect on June 20, 2003. It was adopted following consultation on the DTI‟s White Paper, 
Productivity and Enterprise - A World Class Competition Regime, July 2001. 
4
  EA, Part I established the new statutory body, the OFT (consisting of a chairman and at least four 
other members), abolished the Office of Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT)  and transferred 
all of the DGFT‟s functions, property, rights, and powers to the OFT. 
5  The CAT took over the functions formerly performed by the appeal tribunals of the Competition 
Commission (CCAT) and assumed some new functions. 
6 On May 1, 2004, a new Regulation implementing Articles 101 and 102, Regulation 1/2003, 
became effective. The regulation abolished the notification and authorization system set up by 
Regulation 17 and provided for Article 101(3) to become directly effective.  
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1940776
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had direct effect in the UK,
7
 modernisation had two major consequences. First, the 
UK competition authorities (the OFT and sector regulators) were given the power to 
apply and enforce Articles 101 and 102. Second, the changes to the EU system led to 
changes to the CA98 in order to realign it with the system upon which it is based.
8
 
 Following these upheavals, the regime has had a relatively short period of time 
to settle and for practice to develop. In 2010, the Competition Law Journal published 
a special edition commemorating 10 years of the CA98 prohibitions being in force 
and examining the progress that had been made during that period.
9
 Further, following 
the entry into force of the EA, a significant number of market studies, market 
investigations and merger inquiries have been completed
10
 and three successful 
convictions (all relating to the Marine Hoses case) have been brought under the cartel 
offence.
11
 
It is undoubtedly true that the system of competition enforcement created by 
these provisions is not a simple one. Not only does it involve a large number of 
players (including the OFT, a number of sector regulators, the Competition 
Commission (CC), the Secretary of State, the CAT, super-complainants, private 
litigants and the ordinary civil and criminal courts), but, reflecting their different 
natures, it entails different enforcement systems for the separate regimes – whether 
the CA98 and TFEU competition prohibitions (antitrust cases); market studies and 
investigations (market cases); merger cases; or cartel offence cases. It is also true that 
a number of concerns about the working of the existing system have been expressed. 
Indeed, the Government
12
 has become particularly concerned about institutional 
performance and the level and length of decision-taking. Its concerns include the fact 
that: there have been insufficient decisions under the CA98 to ensure clarity in the 
interpretation of the law and to act as a deterrent to its violation;
13
 many of the 
 
7  These provisions can be relied upon by or against private individuals in disputes arising before the 
UK courts, BRT v SABAM (Case 127/73) [1974] ECR 51. 
8  The Competition Act 1998 and Other Enactments (Amendment) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/1261.  
9
  [2010] Comp Law Volume 9, Issue 2. See also B Rodger (ed), Ten Years of UK Competition Law 
Reform (Dundee University Press, 2010).  
10
  See Department for Business Innovation & Skills, A Competition Regime for Growth: A 
Consultation on Options for Reform, March 2011 (the „Consultation Document‟), chs 3 and 4 and 
Appendix 2 (Tables 4, 5 and 6). 
11
  See e.g., R v Whittle [2008] EWCA Crim 2560 and n 15 below. 
12
  Its views are set out in the Consultation Document. See also more generally the National Audit 
Office Review of the UK‟s Competition Landscape, 22 March 2010. 
13
  The Government is concerned that, compared with other EU Member States, the UK‟s antitrust 
enforcement record is thin and that cases take too long. Indeed, the OFT and sector regulators have 
taken only 27 infringement decisions since the Act came into force in 1990. Further, the UK has, 
between 2004-March 2011, notified only 12 intended Article 101/102 decisions to the European 
Commission (compared to the 71 reported by France, 66 by Germany, 62 by Italy and 42 by 
Spain), see e.g., http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/statistics.html and Consultation Document, 
Table 5.1 and Appendix 2 (statistics on competition cases). See also generally on enforcement in 
the first 10 years of the CA98, M Bloom „The Competition Act at 10 Years Old: Enforcement by 
the OFT and the Sector Regulators‟ [2010] Comp Law 141 and e.g., A Jones and D Trapp, 
„Penalties under the Competition Act 1998: March 2000 to March 2010‟ [2010] Comp Law 228. 
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investigations culminating in infringement decisions under the CA98 have lasted for 
long periods;
14
 the record under the cartel offence suggests concerns about the 
viability of the criminal offence and whether the OFT has sufficient expertise to run a 
criminal investigation successfully;
15
 there have been insufficient numbers of market 
investigations;
16
 and there has been insufficient application of the competition rules 
by the sector regulators.
17
 In addition, the Government has expressed concern that the 
two-stage procedure under the markets and mergers systems (involving both the 
OFT/sector regulators and the CC) results in investigations being unnecessarily 
protracted,
18
 duplication of process, inefficient use of resources and that the voluntary 
merger regime might be proving inadequate to deal with completed mergers.
19
 Not all 
might concur with such a pessimistic view of the current position, however. Rather, 
the view could be taken that, although the OFT may not have adopted as many 
antitrust and cartel cases as it might have done, it has taken time to develop settled 
 
14
  „The UK also seems to take significantly longer over both anti-competitive agreement and abuse of 
dominance cases than other member states. Certain cases can be extremely protracted; for 
example, the tobacco price-fixing case is still at the appeal stage for some parties eight years after 
the OFT opened an investigation‟ Consultation Document, 5.7 and Appendix 2 (average antitrust 
chapter I cases take 30.7 months (excluding appeals) or 38.2 months (including appeals) and 
average chapter II cases take 31.8 months (excluding appeals) or 45 months (including appeals)).  
15
  The only successful criminal prosecutions to date involved the Marine Hoses cartel, see n 11 
above. In this case however the defendants had already pled guilty in the US and were returned to 
the UK on condition that they plead guilty in the English courts. The only other (and contested) 
criminal case brought so far (the BA case) collapsed early on in the trial, see e.g., OFT press 
release 47/10, OFT withdraws criminal proceedings against current and former BA executives, 10 
May 2010,  The Government‟s view is that the high standard of evidence required to establish 
„dishonesty‟ is likely to be one reason for the lack of cases in this area and the consequent 
weakening of the deterrent effect of the offence, see Consultation Document, ch 6 and 6.5. Other 
reasons may be judicial incomprehension „over the damage that price-fixing does‟ (see A  Riley, 
„Outgrowing the Administrative Model? Ten years of British Anti-Cartel Enforcement‟ in Rodger 
(ed), Ten Years of UK Competition Law Reform (Dundee University Press, 2010)) and the 
enforcement structure (see e.g., N Purnell QC, Sir C Bellamy QC, N Kar, D Piccinin and P 
Sahathevan, „Criminal Cartel Enforcement - More Turbulence Ahead? The Implications of the 
BA/Virgin case [2010] Comp Law 313). 
16
  Since 2003, there have been 11 market investigation references (nine by the OFT and two by the 
sector regulators). This is much fewer than the four per year anticipated when the EA regime was 
brought in, Consultation Document, 3.5. 
17
  In addition to applying specialised sectoral regulatory rules, sector regulators exercise concurrent 
competition law powers in the regulated sectors.  The sector regulators have adopted only two 
antitrust infringement decisions and made two market investigation references, despite a 
presumption that they should take responsibility for competition cases in their sectors and that the 
sectors contain many dominant companies, uncompetitive market structures and involve services 
of considerable consumer interest, see Consultation Document, ch 7. 
18
  Although the CC must complete market investigations within 24 months, the OFT does not have to 
complete its initial market study within a set timetable and there are no time limits on remedies. 
„For cases that were referred to the CC, the end-to-end process [for market cases] has taken 
between 33-67 months (including the OFT stage and remedies and, in some cases, legal 
challenge)‟, Consultation Document, 3.5. 
19
  Unlike many merger regimes, the UK merger notification system is voluntary. This can make it 
difficult for the CC when investigating completed deals (approximately half of the deals it 
investigates). Further, it has been estimated that approximately half of potentially anti-competitive 
mergers escape review altogether, see Deloitte Report prepared for the OFT, Deterrence effect of 
competition enforcement by the OFT (2007) and see generally Consultation Document, 4.3-4.5. 
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practice and procedures under the new provisions and to publish substantive and 
procedural guidance;
20
 engaged in debate on complex antitrust issues;
21
 selected some 
cases that have developed the law, particularly under Chapter 1/Article 101;
22
 
engaged in competition advocacy;
23
 and concluded a significant (and some might 
even say excessive) number of market studies.
24
 Further, that the two-stage EA 
procedure for markets and merger cases, although requiring some duplication of 
process, provides a valuable and important mechanism, allowing for an independent 
institution to take a thorough second look at preliminary investigations completed by 
the OFT.
25
  
Although some difficulties with the current regime might, therefore, be 
identifiable, few might perhaps have predicted that the Coalition Government would 
consult on yet further fundamental systemic competition law reform. Nonetheless, in 
October 2010 the Government announced its intention to merge the OFT and CC
26
 as 
part of its „bonfire of the quangos‟27 and, on 16 March 2011, the Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills published a 173 page Consultation Document on 
reform, „A Competition Regime for Growth: A Consultation on Options for 
Reform‟.28 
Following the announcement of the possible merger between the OFT and CC, 
it was immediately evident that the institutional change sought could not occur 
without some change and rethinking of the current system, particularly to the mergers 
and markets regimes which provides separate and independent roles in the process for 
the OFT and CC respectively. It quickly became apparent, however, that the 
 
20
  The OFT is required by law to publish certain guidance. See generally e.g. J Fingleton, The 
importance of a competition agency providing guidance: the UK experience, 4 April 2011.  
21
  See e.g., M Bennett and P Collins, „The law and economics of information sharing: The good, the 
bad and the ugly‟ [2010] European Competition Journal 311 and M Bennett, A Fletcher, E 
Giovannetti and D Stallibrass, „Resale price maintenance: Explaining the controversy, and small 
steps towards a more nuanced policy‟ 30 January 2010, MPRA Paper No 21121, available at 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21121/. 
22
  E.g. involving hub and spoke agreements (see e.g., Case 1022/1/1/03, JJB Sports plc v. Office of 
Fair Trading [2004] CAT 17, aff’d [2006] EWCA Civ 1318). 
23
  See e.g. J Fingleton, Challenges and Opportunities for the Competition Regime‟ [2010] Comp Law 
301, 304 („the competition regime plays a key role in advising and intervening in the various 
aspects of government‟s involvement in markets ... The Competition regime‟s work includes, but 
goes beyond, traditional “competition advocacy”. It advises on the design of new markets and 
opening of existing ones to greater competition, and has a role to play with regard to helping 
ensure competitive neutrality where public services are opened to competition.‟)  
24
  See Consultation Document, Appendix 2, especially Tables 4 and 5. 
25
  As the Consultation Document itself notes this is regarded internationally as a key strength of the 
current system, see n 130 and accompanying text below.. 
26
  See Statement by Vince Cable, 14 October 2010. 
27
  See B Allan, „Redesign of the UK‟s Competition System: The Case for an Efficient Separation of 
Powers‟ [2010] Comp Law 389. 
28
  See n 10 above. 
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Government‟s intention in merging the institutions was not simply (or even?29) to 
achieve cost and efficiency savings, but to support the recovery of the economy, 
economic growth and competition by putting in place a more effective and less 
complex competition regime with stream-lined processes and faster and more 
proactive decision-making by the new single competition and markets authority (the 
„CMA‟). In order to achieve this broader objective, the Consultation Document puts 
up for deliberation a plethora of intertwined proposals designed to deliver benefits to 
competition and consumers and for economic growth. The Government wishes to 
select measures which can be implemented as soon as possible, without significant 
uncertainty and risk for the momentum and the effectiveness of the competition 
regime. 
This paper commences by outlining the principal reform proposals set out in 
the Consultation Paper. Given their huge breadth, however, the paper does not discuss 
each proposal in detail but, following their introduction, focuses on the core proposal 
to create a new CMA and a new procedural framework for decision-taking in each of 
the antitrust, markets and merger regimes. In particular, a key issue considered is how 
the Government proposes to achieve faster and more frequent decision-taking, whilst 
at the same time ensuring accountability, predictability, due process and that the 
system is compliant with the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998
30
 and the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
1950 (ECHR). In the last section some conclusions are drawn. 
The Main Proposals in Outline 
The changes proposed in the Consultation Document are designed broadly (1) to 
improve robustness of decisions and a strengthening of the regime, (2) to support the 
competition authorities in taking forward high impact cases and (3) to improve speed 
and predictability for business. At the core therefore is the objective of introducing 
reform which will allow a greater number of „high impact‟ competition cases to be 
investigated faster, cheaper and more efficiently. In particular, the Government is 
consulting on:  
 how to strengthen and modernise the markets regime (for example, by 
allowing the CMA to investigate multiple markets and to advise on public 
interest issues and by expanding the right to make super-complaints to small 
 
29
  See e.g., keynote speech by L Carstensen, Deputy Chairman of the Competition Commission, to 
the Association of Corporate Counsel Europe Seminar, 9 March 2011 („It should be said at the 
outset that the driver for such a merger, if it happens, will not be cost savings‟) and B Lyons, 
„Under what conditions is one competition authority better than two?‟, available at 
http://competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2011/04/01/under-what-conditions-is-a-single-
competition-authority-better-than-two/  („Cost savings for the taxpayer include a single premises 
and more effective use of staff. The consultation‟s estimate suggests these amount to a tiny 0.18% 
of the benefits of active competition policy. It would be only a fifth of that if we include the value 
of deterrence! It is much harder to estimate business savings, but even a marginal impact of the 
merger on coordination or decision making would almost certainly dominate the contribution of 
cost savings‟). 
30
  Under the Human Rights Act 1998, s 6(1), it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way 
which is incompatible with a Convention (European Convention on Human Rights, ECHR) right. 
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businesses)
31
 and to streamline it (e.g., by introducing new timeframes and 
information gathering powers);
32
 
 whether to reconsider the UK‟s voluntary notification system for mergers and 
how to speed up merger review (for example, whether to introduce mandatory 
notification and whether to streamline the regime by reducing timescales and 
introducing information gathering powers);
33
  
 how the remedies process in mergers and market cases can be made simpler 
and more effective;
34
   
 how to speed up and increase antitrust enforcement by the CMA, including 
whether to introduce a prosecutorial system;
35
  
 whether statutory or administrative timetables should be introduced for 
antitrust cases
36
 and how to encourage private enforcement of the rules;
37
 
 increasing the deterrent effect of the cartel offence by removing its dishonesty 
requirement;
38
  
 
31
  The Government proposes enabling the CMA to carry out in-depth investigations into practices 
across markets and enabling it to provide independent reports to Government on public interest 
issues, Consultation Document, 3.8-3.13. It is also seeking view on whether the super-complaint 
system should be extended to SME bodies, ibid, 3.14-3.16. 
32
  It is seeking views on: a proposal to reduce the Phase 2 market investigation statutory timescales 
(from 24 to 18 months); whether statutory timeframes should be introduced for all market studies 
or only those that have the potential to be referred to a phase 2 investigation; the introduction of 
information gathering powers at the phase 1 stage; and whether any other changes could made to 
facilitate prompt phase 2 referrals, ibid, 3.18-3.23.  
33
  Ibid, ch 4. It is also consulting on the introduction of an exemption from merger control for 
transactions involving small businesses. See also e.g. speech of P Freeman „Merger control: a view 
from the departure lounge‟, March 17 2011. 
34
  Ibid, 3.29-3.38. 
35
  Ibid, ch 5 and see discussion of the decision-making structures for the new CMA below.  
36
  Ibid, 5.48. 
37
  Ibid, 5.49-52. The Governments is considering how to develop a way forward for collective 
redress (see also, Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and business, 
OFT, 2007 and the European Commission‟s public consultation on collective redress, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/index_en.html). It is also 
considering implementation of EA, s16 so as to allow „stand alone‟ (in addition to follow-on) 
actions to be commenced in the CAT and conferring jurisdiction on the CAT to deal on a judicial 
review basis with a procedural challenge against the handling of an antitrust investigation. The 
Government is also considering introducing offences of non-compliance with an investigation and 
is consulting on whether to roll back any unnecessary or unnecessarily intrusive powers of 
investigation.  
38
  The Government is consulting on the question of what, if any, alternative steps should be taken to 
ensure that the offence is sufficiently differentiated from civil antitrust prohibitions and can be 
prosecuted in parallel with civil antitrust enforcement, ibid, ch 6. The Government proposes 
removing the dishonesty requirement from the offence but is consulting on whether: (1) to 
introduce prosecutorial guidance as to the types of agreements that are most likely to warrant 
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 how to strengthen enforcement in the regulated sectors;39  
 the transfer of regulatory reference and appeals functions of the OFT and 
CC;
40
  
 options for future funding of the merger regime and cost recovery in antitrust 
and telecom price control cases;
41
 and 
 how well the current overseas information disclosure gateway is working and 
whether there is a case for reviewing this provision.
42
 
Central to the reform is the proposal that robust competition decision-making should 
be delivered, through more efficient use of scarce public resources, by a single CMA 
which combines functions previously carried out by separate entities.
43
  
The New CMA 
The overall constitutional form and institutional design for the CMA and the 
scope of its activities 
The Government envisages that the CMA will be independent of Ministers, but 
accountable to Parliament.
44
 Further, that it will have a supervisory board, and an 
executive board, with separation of Phase I and Phase II investigations for at least 
market and mergers cases (see further discussion below). The current proposals 
envisage that the Supervisory Board, likely to be made up of a combination of Non-
Executive Directors (the majority) and Executive Directors (including the Chief 
Executive), will have overall responsibility for governance, resourcing, strategy and 
policy, including the development of rules and guidance. The Executive Board, 
chaired by the Chief Executive, will take responsibility for the day to day running of 
the CMA and casework decisions (depending upon the decision-making model 
adopted).
45
 
 
investigation and prosecution; (2) to carve out a set of white listed agreements from the offence 
(such as joint venture agreements); (3) to replace it with a „secrecy‟ element; or (4) to redefine the 
offence so it does not include agreements made openly. 
39
  Ibid, ch 7. The Government is consulting on a number of options, including: (i) removing 
concurrent antitrust and market investigation powers from the sector regulators and giving the 
CMA sole ex post competition law powers in the regulated sectors; (ii) taking steps to improve the 
use and coordination of concurrent competition powers and to encourage more proactive use of 
competition powers in the regulated sectors.  
40
  Ibid ch 8. 
41
  Ibid, ch 11. 
42
  Ibid, ch 12. 
43
  Ibid, chs 5, 9 and 10. 
44
  It could be a non ministerial department (like e.g., the OFT), a non departmental public body (like 
e.g., the CC) or a public corporation (like e.g., Ofcom). 
45
  It is proposed that the Supervisory Board will be chaired by a non-executive director and will be 
accountable to parliament for performance but not for individual decisions. This „dual‟ structure is 
unusual among economic regulators in the UK. In particular, it seems odd to have a „supervisory 
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The Government is also consulting on the appropriate objectives for the CMA 
and whether these should be embedded in statute. It proposes, in paragraph 9.2 of the 
Consultation Document, that the main scope of its activity should be antitrust, merger, 
and market cases, review of undertakings and orders, assessing challenges to sector 
regulator‟s decisions, resolving disputes relating to licences and price modification 
proposals and competition advocacy. It is proposed that many of the OFT‟s current 
consumer enforcement powers will be transferred, although the Government considers 
that the CMA should continue to consider consumer issues when conducting market 
studies.
46
 Paragraph 9.2 does not state that one of the CMA‟s activities should be 
criminal cartel cases. Although the document consults on reform of the wording of the 
criminal cartel offence, it does not specifically address enforcement and whether it 
should be the CMA or another agency (for example, a new single Economic Crime 
Agency or the Serious Fraud Office) which should have the key responsibility for 
prosecution of the offence.
47
 
A single or differing decision-making processes across the competition ‘tools’? 
The creation of a new CMA requires that decision-making structures be set up for 
each of the competition „tools‟48 available to it. Under the current regime, decision-
making structures are quite different for mergers and market cases and antitrust cases 
respectively.
49
 In consulting on reform, one of the issues addressed is whether the 
CMA should adopt the same processes across all competition tools (mergers, markets 
and antitrust), whether specific decision-making structures should be used for each 
tool or whether some half way house should be adopted with commonality of 
processes but some adaption of process by tool. In identifying any appropriate 
decision-making process, other crucial issues arising are, in particular: whether there 
should be separation of phase 1 and 2 decision-makers, whether any phase 2 panels 
should have investigatory as well as an adjudicatory functions, the role that „panels‟ 
should play in the decision-making process (and their nature) and how the appeals 
system should be structured to ensure due process and that the system is ECHR 
compliant.
50
 
The Government seems to accept that different approaches to the tools may be 
required which, without leading to organisational complexity, might ensure tailored, 
 
board‟ which would not be accountable for, or in control of, decisions taken by the executive 
board.  
46
  See Consultation Document, 9.21-9.31. The proposal to take away the CMA‟s consumer powers is 
controversial, however, see e.g., OFT Press Release 37/11, OFT Welcomes consultation on  the 
Competition and Markets Authority, 16 March 2011 and P Collins, OFT fears narrowing range of 
powers, Financial Times,. 17 April 2011 
47
  The Government is considering the creation of an economic crime agency to prosecute a number 
of white collar crimes currently prosecuted by different agencies, see e.g., 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-centre/news/economic-crime. 
48
  This is the term used in the Consultation Document to describe the different types of competition 
proceedings that can be brought by the new CMA.,  
49
  Enforcement of the cartel offence, of course, requires criminal prosecution before an independent 
court (as is the case for any other crime). The Consultation Document does not discuss 
enforcement of the cartel offence, however, see n 47 and accompanying text. 
50
  See especially Consultation Document, Figure 10.1. 
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improved and more efficient decision-making in each case. For each tool, the 
Consultation Document considers a base case decision-making model for the single 
CMA (involving limited changes to the existing procedural framework) and other 
more radical options for change. 
The ECHR: due process, the right to a fair trial and the EU debate 
The Government acknowledges that the new regime must ensure that the UK 
institutional architecture, and any more streamlined procedures introduced, 
sufficiently protect an investigated undertaking‟s rights of defence and are ECHR 
compliant. Currently, UK procedures provide higher standards of protection for 
undertakings‟ rights than those that exist under the EU system.51 This is of importance 
as the Consultation Document has been published at a time when concern about the 
compatibility of the EU antitrust enforcement structure with ECHR provisions is 
mounting. The EU debate on this subject has escalated recently
52
 in light both of (i) 
the “more prosecutorial” nature of competition proceedings;53 (ii) the increasing 
levels of fines imposed by the Commission in its Article 101 and 102 infringement 
decisions
54
 and, crucially, (iii) the development of ECHR case law and, following the 
Lisbon Treaty, the EU‟s commitment to accede to the ECHR.55 Broadly, the core 
issue which has been raised is whether the EU enforcement system is satisfactory and 
complies with the investigated undertaking‟s right „[i]n the determination of his civil 
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him‟ to a „fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal‟ (see 
Article 6(1) ECHR) (the „right to a fair trial‟).56 
 
51
  See e.g., H Schweitzer, „The European Competition Law Enforcement System and the Evolution 
of Judicial Review‟ in C-D Ehlermann and M Marquis eds European Competition Law Annual 
2009: Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases (Hart Publishing, 
2010) and available at http://www.eui.eu/Documents/RSCAS/Research/Competition/2009/2009-
COMPETITION-Schweitzer.pdf („[t]he institutional structure appears geared to a high degree of 
internal and external controls. The interaction between the OFT and the CC - two independent 
competition agencies - is unique, and provides for internal control. External control mechanisms in 
the form of judicial review are also exceptionally strong ...‟) and n 87 below.  
52
  But the concern is not a new one, see e.g., F Graupner, „Competition Decision-Making on 
Competition Questions‟ [1973] CMLRev 291 and F Montag, „The Case for Radical Reform of the 
Infringement Procedure under Regulation 17‟ (1996) ECLR 428. 
53
  See e.g., H Schweitzer, op cit n 51 („The European system of competition law enforcement has 
changed over time. The replacement of Reg. 17/62 with Reg. 1/2003, in particular the abolition of 
the notification regime. as well as the Commission‟s increased leeway to set its own enforcement 
priorities including an intensified “fight against cartels” have had some unexpected effects: public 
competition law enforcement has become less “administrative” in nature, and more prosecutorial.‟) 
54
  Especially since the introduction of the new fining Guidelines in 2006, „Guidelines on the method 
of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003‟ [2006] OJ  C 210/2. 
55
  (And the entry into force of the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU), see Consolidated version 
of the TEU, TFEU and the Charter and TEU, art 6(2), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1296&lang=en. 
56
  The right to a fair trial includes the right to give evidence in one‟s own defence, to hear the 
evidence against one, to be able to examine and cross-examine witnesses as well as other matters 
of due process, such as the right against self-incrimination. See also the EU Charter of fundamental 
rights, art 47. 
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There now seems to be fairly widespread acceptance that antitrust proceedings 
which may culminate in the imposition of punitive fines (designed to have deterrent 
effect) are, in spite of the characterisation of the fines in Regulation 1/2003 as 
administrative charges,
57
 to be treated as de facto „criminal‟ charges within the 
meaning of Article 6(1) ECHR.
58
 Consequently, in addition, to their entitlement, 
within a reasonable time, to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal, 
undertakings investigated for a possible violation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are 
presumed innocent until proven guilty (Article 6(2) ECHR
59
) and are entitled to 
benefit from certain minimum rights set out in Article 6(3) ECHR. Divergent views 
exist, however, as to the consequences of the characterisation of competition 
proceedings as „criminal‟ ones. In particular, a contested issue is whether the right to a 
trial before an independent and impartial tribunal can be satisfied where an 
administrative body (such as the European Commission), which does not itself qualify 
as an independent and impartial tribunal, adopts initial infringement decisions 
following its own investigation of the case,
60
 but where an independent and impartial 
tribunal is able to review and, if necessary, annul that decision (in the EU - on the 
grounds set out in Article 263 TFEU).
61
 It seems clear that if the proceedings are 
characterised as „core‟ or „hardcore‟ criminal offences, it will not. Rather, in this 
scenario, a fair and public hearing must be conducted before an independent tribunal 
in first instance proceedings – a first decision by an administrative body is 
insufficient.
62
  
 
57
  Regulation 1/2003, art 23(5). It seems that merger and market cases concern an undertaking‟s civil 
rights and obligations, so that investigated undertakings also have a right to a fair trial, see n 125 
below and accompanying text. 
58
  See especially, Engel v Netherlands (1979-80) 1 EHRR 647, Stenuit v France[1992] ECC 401, 
Hercules Chemicals NV v Commission (Case  T-7/89) [1991] ECR II-1711 (opinion of AG 
Vesterdorf), Baustahlgewebe v Commission (Case 185/95) [1998] ECR I-8417, (Opinion of AG 
Leger), Netherlandse Feteratieve Vereigning voor de Goothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v 
Commission (Case C105/05) [2006] ECR I-8725 (opinion of AG Kokott), KME Germany AG v 
Commission (Case C-272/09P), 10 February 2011 (Opinion of AG Sharpston), Case 1001/1/1/01, 
Napp v OFT [2002] CAT 1, paras 91-103, D Slater, S Thomas, D Waelbroeck, „Competition Law 
Proceedings before the European Commission and the Right to a Fair Trial: No Need for Reform?‟ 
(2009) European Competition Journal 97 and  Consultation Document, Annex 1, 84. 
59
  See e.g., Hüls v Commission (Case C-199/92P) [1999] ECR 4287, para 150. 
60
  In the EU system of competition enforcement, there is no division between those who investigate, 
prepare the statement of objections setting out the „charges‟ the undertakings under investigation 
must answer, draft the decision and propose the fine. The process does not provide for any hearing 
before an independent decision-maker on matters of substance. Further, the final decisions are 
actually taken by the College of Commissioners, a body of political appointees which have not 
been involved in the hearing or heard any of the evidence adduced. 
61
  A review of the „legality‟ of the decision (rather than a full appeal to the court). The Court, 
however, has unlimited jurisdiction with regard to penalties, see TFEU art 261 and discussion n 71 
below.   
62
  Jusilla v Finland (2007) 45 EHHR 39. See, in particular, e.g., I Forrester, „Due Process in EC 
competition cases: A distinguished institution with flawed procedures‟ (2009) EL  Rev 817, D 
Slater, S Thomas, D Waelbroeck n 58 above and WPJ Wils, „The Increased Level of EU Antitrust 
Fines, Judicial Review, and the European Convention on Human Rights‟ (2010) 33(1) World 
Competition 5. 
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It has been argued, however, that different considerations may apply where 
proceedings are against legal, rather than natural, persons and/or where the 
proceedings involve civil or „minor‟ (non-core) criminal offences (not strictly 
belonging to traditional criminal law categories, such as traffic offences, tax 
surcharges and, possibly, competition law infringements).
63
 In particular, case-law of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) suggests that some minor criminal 
offences do not require such stringent safeguards and protection as „core‟ criminal 
offences. Rather, in such cases an administrative body may determine the issue as a 
preliminary matter, so long as its proceedings are governed by sufficiently strong 
procedural guarantees and its decision is subject to sufficient judicial control
64
 by a 
body with „full jurisdiction‟65 on questions of fact and of law and with power to quash 
challenged decision in all respects.
66
  
The European Commission‟s view is that the current EU system, which has 
provided the Commission with an important and central role in the development of 
EU competition policy,
67
 is compatible at EU level with the ECHR and that major 
change to the enforcement and institutional structure is not necessary. Rather, the 
Commission‟s position is that the administrative system is based, like others which 
rely on a judicial system (such as the US), on solid legal traditions, with the ultimate 
aim of attaining the truth while respecting the rights of the parties. „This is why I do 
not think we can say that one system [administrative or judicial] is better than the 
other.‟68  
The Commission‟s perspective is not, however, universally held and serious 
questions undoubtedly hang over the issues of (1) whether EU antitrust proceedings 
are „core‟ criminal proceedings for Art 6 ECHR purposes which require determination 
by an independent tribunal at first instance;
69
 and (2) whether, even if it is correct that 
 
63
  See especially e.g., WPJ Wils, n 62 above. 
64
  Jusilla v Finland (2007) 45 EHHR 39, para 43. 
65
  Ibid and see Janosevic v Sweden 21 May 2003 and Le Compte, Van Leuven and de Meyere v 
Belgium [1982] 4 EHRR 1, and e.g., KME Germany AG v Commission (Case C-272/09P), 10 
February 2011 (Opinion of AG Sharpston, paras 67-69).  
66
  See e.g., Cimenteries CBR SA v Commission (Case T-25/95) [2000] ECR II-491, paras 718-9, I. 
Forrester, „A Bush in Need of Pruning: the Luxuriant Growth of “Light Judicial Review” in C-D 
Ehlermann and M Marquis (eds) European Competition Law Annual 2009: Evaluation of Evidence 
and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases (Hart Publishing, 2010) and articles cited n 62 
above. 
67
  See n 103 below. 
68
  A Italianer, Safeguarding due process in antitrust proceedings; Fordham Competition Law 
Institute, 23 September 2010. See also J Almunia, SPEECH/10/449, Due process and competition 
enforcement, Florence, 17 September 2010. 
69
  See e.g., I Forrester, op cit n 62 above, 821 („I submit that the procedures of the European 
Commission in determining guilt or innocence under the competition rules, and in imposing 
sanctions, manifestly do not correspond to the standards established by the ECHR‟), A 
Andreangeli et al „Enforcement by the Commission: The decisional and enforcement structure in 
antitrust cases and the Commission's fining system‟ in M Morela and D Waelbroek Towards an 
Optimal Enforcement of Competition Rules in Europe, GCLC Annual Conference 11-12 June 2009 
(„competition law infringements leading to the imposition of sanctions cannot anymore be 
regarded legally as “mere administrative sanctions”, or “minor offences” and that necessary 
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competition proceedings should be treated as minor criminal (or even civil - in the 
case of merger) proceedings, the judicial review conducted by the General Court 
(controlling legality, and not providing for a full merits review of a Commission‟s 
decision
70
) is broad and intense enough to remedy deficiencies in the first instance 
decision and to constitute effective review and scrutiny sufficient to ensure a full, fair, 
impartial and timely protection of the individual rights at stake so that ECHR 
obligations are discharged.
71
 Some of these issues are currently pending before the 
General Court
72
 and it seems likely that they may, ultimately, have to be resolved by 
the ECtHR itself.
73
  
Antitrust Enforcement 
The Options 
The CA98 and EU antitrust prohibitions are currently chiefly enforced by the OFT, 
which has power to investigate violations of the Act, to issue infringement decisions 
and to impose penalties on undertakings found to be in breach.
74
 Sector regulators 
have concurrent power to enforce the prohibitions within their regulated sectors.
75
 If 
no appeal follows an OFT or sector regulator decision, the proceedings end there. In a 
majority of cases to date, however, proceedings have been brought before the CAT, 
which hears full merit appeals from such decisions.
76
 The CAT has power to confirm, 
 
safeguards provided by Article 6 ECHR have therefore to be accorded to the fullest extent) and D 
Slater, S Thomas, D Waelbroeck, op cit n 58 above. 
70
  TFEU, art 263 gives the Court of Justice jurisdiction to review the legality of actions of the 
Commission „on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural 
requirement, infringement of this Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of 
powers‟). TFEU, art 261 gives the Court of Justice unlimited jurisdiction with regard to the 
penalties provided for in regulations adopted pursuant to the provisions of the TFEU. See also n 71 
below.  
71
  See KME Germany AG v Commission (Case C-272/09P), 10 February 2011 (Opinion of AG 
Sharpston, paras 67-69) and n 69. One issue that has arisen is whether the Court‟s unlimited 
jurisdiction with regard to the penalties provided for in TFEU, art 261 may give it unlimited 
jurisdiction (and broader jurisdiction than that set out in TFEU, art 263) to review the decision 
imposing the fines as well as the fines themselves, see I Forrester n 66 above. 
72
  See, especially, Saint-Gobain Glass France v Commission (Case T-56/09) (judgment pending) 
(one of the pleas in support of their action is, „infringement of the right to an independent and 
impartial tribunal and of the right to respect for the presumption of innocence in so far as the fine 
was imposed by an administrative authority which holds simultaneously powers of investigation 
and sanction, and that Regulation No 1/2003 is unlawful in far as it does not provide for that right 
to an independent and impartial tribunal‟) and Schindler Holding v Commission (Case T-138/07) 
(judgment pending) (pleas in support of the action include „infringement of the principle of 
division of powers and due process‟). 
73
  The debate in the EU is further complicated by the fact that the final decision is adopted by the 
College of Commissioners, political appointees, who despite not being involved in the proceedings 
take the final decision collectively by majority vote, see n 60 above.  
74
  CA98, see especially ss 25-28, 32 and 36. 
75
  The Government notes in the Consultation document that the paucity of CA98 and market 
investigation cases in concurrent sectors is regarded by many as a weakness of the regime, see n  
39 above. This paper does not discuss the proposals to strengthen enforcement in regulated sectors. 
76
  CA98 ss 46&47. 
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set aside, or vary the decision, remit the matter to the OFT (or sector regulator), or to 
make any other decision that the OFT could have made.
77
  
 This system does not involve the CC which is not designated to investigate 
and enforce the antitrust provisions. No change to the antitrust enforcement structure 
is thus technically required by the merger of the OFT and the CC: OFT powers could 
simply be transferred to the CMA, in the same way as DGFT powers were transferred 
to the OFT when the OFT was created by the EA.
78
 Although building on the existing 
system is one option considered by the Government, the Government is, however, as 
already noted, keen to enhance the effectiveness of the CA98 regime and its deterrent 
effect. The Government considers that this will be achieved if the reform delivers a 
greater number of competition cases across the board (antitrust, market and merger) 
under shorter procedural timescales than apply currently.
79
 The Government believes 
that the relatively few decisions taken and length of UK antitrust investigations is 
explicable partly because the antitrust process is onerous compared with the use of 
other powers
80
 and partly as a result of the fact that cases are effectively „run twice‟: 
not only do the OFT and sector regulators conduct lengthy investigation, prosecution 
and adjudication processes, but the CAT conducts full appeals on the merit. The 
Government‟s proposals for reform thus also consider whether the system can be 
streamlined, either at the investigative, decision-making or at the appeal stage, whilst 
ensuring that due process and procedural fairness is respected. The Government is 
consulting on three options outlined in Table 1 below. Option 1 builds on streamlining 
measures already in hand to streamline the administrative decision-making process 
but leaves in place the CAT‟s full merits review. Option 2 provides for reforms to 
decision-making, with additional checks and balances inserted at the investigatory and 
decision-taking stages within the CMA but with a shortened process at the appeal 
stage. Option 3 requires the CMA to prosecute cases before the CAT and, therefore, 
for decisions to be taken judicially.
81
 All options envisage that the CAT will remain 
part of the system of judicial oversight in competition cases. 
 
77
  Ibid, Sched 8, para 3(2). 
78
  See n 4 above. 
79
  See n 37 above. 
80
  Consultation Document, 5.10  
81
  „Although the desirability of a “second pair of eyes” has acquired the status of an unquestionable 
truth, its meaning and implementation require closer examination. As a matter of language, the 
concept is ambiguous. A weak version is satisfied where the “second pair of eyes” is simply 
second in time to the “first pair of eyes”: that version is observed where the “first pair of eyes” acts 
purely as an initial screen to identify those cases that require detailed investigation by the “second 
pair of eyes”. The strong version requires that the “first pair of eyes” advance the case for 
enforcement action upon which the “second pair of eyes” decides.‟ B Allan, op cit n 27 above, 
396. 
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Table 1: Summary of options for antitrust enforcement reform 
Proposed 
Approaches 
Role of CMA Role of CAT 
Option 1 
(retaining and 
enhancing 
existing 
procedures) 
OFT‟s existing procedures for making 
decisions would be retained and 
enhanced for CMA. This option 
would build on and augment 
improvements to current decision-
making process by OFT in last 11 
years.
82
 CMA would decide on 
infringement and penalty (integrated 
decision-making body) possibly 
within transparent, administrative 
timetables. 
CAT to retain full merits 
appeal jurisdiction. 
Option 2 
(developing a 
new 
administrative 
approach) 
Strengthen the procedural safeguards 
and independence and impartiality of 
the decision-making stage in the 
current system by e.g.: creating an 
independent and impartial Internal 
Tribunal within the CMA to 
adjudicate and decide on cases 
brought by Phase I teams within the 
CMA or sector regulators; providing 
for final decisions on infringements 
and penalties to be taken by CC style 
investigatory and adjudicatory panels 
following a phase 2 investigation; or 
reinforcing due process arrangements. 
Appeal before CAT to be on 
judicial review basis or 
„enhanced judicial review‟ 
(on the same grounds as 
available under Art 263 
TFEU). 
 
Option 3 (more 
prosecutorial) - 
institutional 
separation of the 
prosecutorial 
and decision-
making 
functions 
The CMA (or sector regulators) 
would be required to prosecute the 
case before the CAT – removing a 
significant layer in the system. Unlike 
the current position, the CMA would 
not take any decisions or impose any 
remedies itself.  
The CAT would decide on 
infringement and penalty. In 
this option therefore the CAT 
is the final decision-maker 
before which the CMA (or 
sector regulators
83
) must 
make its case.
84
 
 
82
  The OFT is already testing new methods for speeding up and improving procedure and case-team 
efficiency, eg through considering narrowing the scope of its investigations, more sophisticated 
information gathering, the trial of a Procedural Adjudicator and a greater willingness to consider 
commitments and early resolution of cases, see e.g., OFT1263, A guide to the OFT‟s 
investigations procedures in competition cases (March 2011) and Consultation Document, 5.24-
5.27. 
83
  But see n 39 above. 
84
  The Consultation Document does not discuss further appeals but, presumably, any subsequent 
appeal would be on the same basis as currently, i.e., on a point of law to the Court of Appeal.  
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Selecting an approach 
It seems clear that UK antitrust proceedings (which may culminate in significant fines 
being imposed) are, like EU ones, „criminal‟ within the meaning of Article 6(1) 
ECHR.
85
 Some of the suggestions proffered in Options 1 and 2 of the Consultation 
Document are only consistent with Article 6 ECHR, therefore, if it is correct that 
antitrust proceedings can be characterised as „minor‟ criminal offences. In such cases, 
an initial decision by an administrative body may be compliant with Article 6 if it is 
subject to full judicial review by an independent and impartial tribunal.
86
 At the time 
the CA98 was originally adopted, the UK legislator took the view that a far-reaching 
full merits view was an essential factor to ensure compatibility with the Human Rights 
Act and in ensuring the fairness and transparency of the new competition regime since 
decision-making was to be entrusted to the OFT, an integrated decision-maker.
87
 The 
options for reform proposed by the current Government, however, indicate that the 
Government‟s view now is that if greater procedural protection is provided at the 
decision-taking stage, then a full merits review may not be required. Option 2 thus 
provides for an inverse relationship between the procedural safeguards provided 
within the CMA and the level of review to be conducted by the CAT (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Options 1 and 2 - relationship between decision-making structure and 
level of review  
Procedural safeguards/independence and impartiality at decision-making stage 
Weaker                                                                                                   Stronger 
Option 1                                    Variants on Option 2                                    Option 2 
CMA investigates 
and decides 
CMA investigates 
and decides but due 
process arrangements 
reinforced 
CMA investigates 
but Phase I team 
hands over to Phase 
2 team for further 
investigation and 
decision 
Phase I CMA case 
team to make case 
before independent 
and impartial tribunal 
within CMA itself  
Full merits appeal EU-style „judicial review‟ Judicial Review 
 
Stronger                          Intensity of judicial review                          Weaker 
 
85
  See n 58 above. 
86
  See discussion above of the ECHR: due process, the right to a fair trial and the EU debate.  
87
  „It is our intention that the tribunal should be primarily concerned with the correctness or otherwise 
of the conclusions contained in the appealed decision and not with how the decision was reached 
or the reasoning expressed in it ... Wherever possible, we want the tribunal to decide a case on the 
facts before it, even where there has been a procedural error, and to avoid remitting the case to the 
director general. We intend to reflect that policy in the tribunal rules…‟ Nigel Griffiths MP, 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Competition and Consumer Affairs, June 18, 1998. See 
also B Allan, op cit n 27, 400 („At the time of enacting the Competition Act 1998, [the EU review 
model] was deemed insufficient to guarantee due process, not least to comply with Art 6 of the 
Convention‟). 
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Option 1 provides essentially for the preservation of the status quo in terms of system 
design (integrated decision-making within the CMA and a full merits appeal) with 
operational enhancements aimed at speeding up the decision-making process. Clearly 
this choice involves the least change from the position today and hence least risk in 
terms of a loss of momentum and a hiatus in enforcement.
88
 It does not seem to 
address the Government‟s essential concern that antitrust cases are effectively heard 
twice, however. Further, the Government states that „the option may not be 
sufficiently radical to bring about significant improvements in the speed and 
throughput of antitrust decisions‟.89 It is not clear what, if any, work has been done 
either by the Government or the OFT to evaluate whether, and to what extent, the 
factors driving the length of investigations and/or the number of investigations 
conducted are related to the structure of the enforcement system rather than 
operational matters. However, the Consultation Document lists a number of areas in 
which the OFT, based on its experience to date, has already recently made various 
improvements, for example, regarding the sophistication of information gathering and 
discussion of draft information requests to better focus its evidence gathering.
90
 As 
several of these operational improvements have been introduced relatively recently, 
and their effect on decision-making will not yet have been fully reflected in terms of 
final decisions, there may well be greater scope to contract the decision-making stage 
and improve operational and case management processes within the CMA than the 
Consultation Document perhaps envisages.
91
  
The core proposal in Option 2 and the Option 3 proposal provide, more 
radically, for the CMA (and sector regulators) to bring antitrust cases before an 
independent and impartial tribunal. Option 2 envisages that the tribunal should be 
constructed within the CMA and Option 3 envisages that the cases should be brought 
before the institutionally separate CAT. If it is correct that antitrust proceedings do 
fall within the hardcore of criminal offences, then ECHR law requires that an initial 
infringement decision be taken by an independent and impartial tribunal.
92
 Whilst 
some uncertainty exists over the question of whether competition law proceedings 
constitute core or minor criminal matters under the ECHR, best practice would seem 
to point towards increased independence at the decision-making stage. Option 3 
provides for institutional separation between the prosecutor and decision-maker and, 
consequently, the clear impartiality of the latter.
93
 In addition, to having the advantage 
of ensuring ECHR compliance and best-practice, Option 3 would seem:  
 
88
  It does involve potential risk in terms of ECHR compliance, however, see n 86 and accompanying 
text. although this is no greater than is the case for the current system of enforcement by the OFT. 
89
  Consultation Document, 5.29. 
90
  See n 82 above. 
91
  See also the steps recently taken by the OFT to improve process and increase transparency (n 82 
above). 
92
  See discussion above of ECHR: due process, right to a fair trial and the EU debate. 
93
  For the view that institutional separation would provide the best model for enforcement of the 
antitrust prohibition, see B Allan, op cit n 27. 
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(i) to respect the „spirit‟ of ECtHR judgments which require serious criminal 
charges to be heard at first instance before an independent and impartial 
tribunal;
94
  
(ii) to allow antitrust defendants to benefit from additional safeguards which 
are closer to those available to firms facing charges under comparable criminal 
offences with comparable levels of penalty.
95
 Further, other severe 
consequences may follow a finding of infringement, including the payment of 
damages in follow-on litigation;
96
 
(iii) to provide greatest respect for the „presumption of innocence‟ that 
antitrust defendants benefit from; and  
(iv) to go some way to reducing the need for the OFT to conduct two resource-
intensive processes, both when establishing and working up an antitrust case 
before adopting a final decision (and the statement of objections that precedes 
it) and, subsequently, defending the merits of such decisions before the CAT.  
The Consultation notes that if this option were adopted, some thought would have to 
be given to if, and how, the CAT could be guided on fining levels and to what, if 
anything, could be done to replace the guidance businesses can receive by way of a 
case closure or non-infringement decision by a competition authority.
97
 A number of 
other procedures, including a process for potential settlement, would have to be 
reconsidered too. One solution for settlements might be to adopt a process similar to 
the „consent decree‟ procedure pursued by the DOJ in the US in civil enforcement 
actions.
98
 Under this procedure, consent decrees must be filed before a federal district 
court with a competitive impact statement both for public consultation and approval 
by the court.
99
 The court only enters the decree if it determines, taking account of 
 
94
  See discussion above of ECHR: due process, right to a fair trial and the EU debate. 
95
  Indeed, CA98 fines now generally outstrip those imposed for violation of criminal offences such as 
bribery and corruption, see A Jones and D Trapp op cit n 13, n 92. See also I Forrester op cit n 62 
above. 
96
  See n 37 above. 
97
  National competition authorities are not, however, competent to take „negative‟ decisions on the 
merits under Articles 101 and 102. Only the Commission is competent to make a finding that there 
has bee no infringement, see, Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Konkurencji i Konsumentów v Tele2 Polska 
sp. zoo, now Netia SA w Warszawie (Case C-375/09), 3 May 2011, see also the Opinion of AG 
Mazák, („the EU legislature conferred on the Commission exclusive competence to adopt negative 
decisions on the merits (inapplicability decisions)‟, para 35). 
98
  As this procedure is used in civil, not criminal, cases in the US it is not used in fining cases. Any 
UK procedure would need to reflect this difference. In Australia agreed resolutions of cartel cases 
are also frequently put before the court for endorsement, see e.g. A Guirguis, „Cartels: Early Court 
resolution in Australia – the Experience – The Challenge‟, available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc739.pdf. 
99
  The Tunney Act (the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974), amended the Clayton Act 
and the changes are now incorporated in Clayton Act s 5(b)-(h), 15 USC, s 16(b)-(h). 
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specified factors including the impact of the judgment upon competition in the 
relevant market(s), „that the entry of such judgment is in the public interest‟.100 
Although intuitively attractive on paper, Option 3 is,  in spite of the 
Government‟s view that the „big‟ changes required would be „in principle relatively 
straightforward‟,101 likely to be the most challenging for the CMA, at least in the short 
term, (i.e., during the first few years of implementation). Even though it might secure 
the efficiency benefits sought in the long run (allowing for the application of more 
flexible court rules and evidence to be heard just once in open court), such a dramatic 
change would require concomitant radical alterations in working practices and culture 
within the CMA from those of either the OFT or the CC and a fundamental overhaul 
and reworking of procedures developed by the OFT in antitrust cases to date. The 
CMA would require a very different mix of staff with more litigators/ prosecutors and 
fewer generalist case handlers. It would also involve considerable change for the CAT 
which does not currently act as a first-instance trial court.
102
 This might mean that 
enforcement wanes for an initial period whilst the CMA retrains and rethinks future 
workings practices. Indeed, although it is difficult to judge likely effects on speed of 
investigations for a new institution seeking to apply a wholly new procedure, there 
would clearly be a „learning curve‟ and an incentive for the CMA to be seen to „get it 
right‟ initially. This may mean that speed will be compromised in favour of 
thoroughness and caution. Another important objection from the current competition 
agencies perspective may be the loss of control over competition policy that the 
change could entail. It could well mean that the CMA would not be able to play such 
a pivotal role as the centrepiece of the competition system and as the driver of the 
competition policy agenda as its predecessors were able to do.
103
 It is also not possible 
to assess what impact this change would have on the incentives for the CMA as to 
whether to use its antitrust powers or other competition and/or consumer powers 
available to it. 
 
100
  15 USC s 16(e) deals with how the public interest determination must be made by the court.  
101
  Consultation Document, 5.45. 
102
  The President and many of the Chairmen of the CAT are, however, chancery division judges who 
of course have extensive experience of hearing facts and cases at first instance. The Government is 
also consulting on giving the CAT jurisdiction to hear standalone private actions (see n 37 and 
accompanying text above) and some CAT cases have involved lengthy witness testimony (see e.g., 
Case 1022/1/1/03, JJB Sports plc v. Office of Fair Trading [2004] CAT 17, aff’d [2006] EWCA 
Civ 1318, Case 1099/1/2/08, National Grid plc v The Gas and Electricity Markets Authority [2009] 
CAT 14, aff’d but fine reduced [2010] EWCA Civ 114 and the „Tobacco‟ appeals, e.g. Case 
1160/1/1/10, Imperial Tobacco Group plc v OFT).  
103
  See also J Almunia, SPEECH/10/449, „Due process and competition enforcement‟ Florence, 17 
September 2010 („One advantage of our model over the judicial system is that it has helped us take 
forward the analytical part of our work. When you think how a pure judicial system could work in 
a Union composed by 27 member states, with different cultures, different systems, this advantage 
appears quite clearly. Over the years, we have established a system that incorporates the very best 
economic analysis into competition enforcement‟). See also OFT‟s concern about the creation of a 
new EU Competition Court (decision and policy making functions would shift away from the 
Commission to the new EU Court), House of Lords Select Committee (EU-Fifteenth Report), para 
76. 
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By contrast, in Option 2, the Government considers whether, alternatively, it 
could develop the administrative approach so that the first instance decision within the 
CMA is taken by an „independent‟ and „impartial‟ tribunal housed within the CMA 
itself. The Government considers this option to be compatible with Article 6 ECHR if 
stringent conditions are satisfied (for example, by ensuring that members of the 
tribunal are not involved in, and are distanced from, the investigation and prosecution 
of cases, that one or more members is suitably legally qualified and appointed by the 
head of the judiciary, that members are appointed by an external person or body 
and/or that there is a clear and comprehensive policy on conflicts and bias). The 
Government believes this proposal would allow for cases to be argued at an earlier 
stage than is currently the case, would ensure greater consistency in decision-making, 
reduce the burden on CMA staff and sector regulators in progressing their cases and 
allow the appeal before the CAT to be conducted by way of judicial review.
104
 If the 
Government wishes to provide for cases to be tried before an independent adjudicator, 
however, it is hard to understand in what way this suggestion is preferable to Option 
3. The CAT is already an expert and institutionally „independent and impartial‟ 
competition tribunal and satisfies the appointment and other criteria the Government 
refers to. In that light it is not clear why significant cost, effort and measures should 
be incurred to recreate a new internal (but impartial) tribunal within the CMA itself. 
Further, whatever safeguards are put in place, it would seem inherently less likely that 
an internal body would be willing to exercise as rigorous and independent a review as 
the CAT has proved itself willing to conduct. If it were to do so, there would be 
significant risk of institutional disharmony.
105
 In addition, it seems likely that, the 
curtailing of appeal rights to a structurally independent court would be likely to 
involve the new UK competition regime in early challenges to its compatibility with 
the ECHR.
106
 
In addition to its proposal to create an internal adjudicatory panel within the 
CMA, the government consults in Option 2 on some other variants for a new 
administrative approach which it proposes will strengthen due process and the 
protection of rights of defence at the „administrative‟ stage, so permitting a lighter 
(and hence shorter) review to be conducted at the judicial stage. The Consultation thus 
asks if, for example, „further protections‟ could be built in to the current OFT 
arrangements for antitrust enforcement (for example, by adopting the European 
Commission‟s procedure of using a Hearing Officer, by specifying decision-makers or 
by mandating oral hearings at which the parties can directly address decision-
makers).
107
 Alternatively, whether decision-making within the CMA could „follow the 
same process as phase 2 of mergers and market cases and be led and determined by 
panels of independent office holders. The panel would have an investigatory as well 
as an adjudicatory role (unlike an Internal Tribunal which would be adjudicatory 
 
104
  On the basis that an independent and impartial tribunal with full jurisdiction has been created 
internally, see Consultation Documents, especially 5.32-5.35 and Annex 1, 82-87.  
105
  See also n 45 above. 
106
  See n 112-114 and accompanying text below.  
107
  Ibid, 5.40. The Consultation Document notes that these proposals are already being proposed or 
trialled by the OFT as part of its streamlining exercise (see n 82 above) but asks whether other 
steps could be taken in this direction 
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only)‟.108 The Government considers that this latter proposal might have the 
advantage of aligning procedure across the „tools‟,109 so improving overall coherence 
of the regime, and might provide a „higher degree of transparency, rigour, protection 
against confirmation bias and access to decision-makers. It would introduce a well 
established mechanism for effective, independent project management and robust 
evidential and economic analysis that has been shown to work for mergers and market 
investigations.‟110  
Although the Government considers that these two variants might not provide 
sufficient separation between the investigation, prosecution and decision-making 
functions to allow appeal before the CAT to be by way of judicial review,
111
 it is 
considering whether they would be sufficient to allow the appeals to be on the same 
basis and grounds as those made to the European General Court under Articles 261 
and 263 TFEU. As currently specified it is not clear how, if at all, the „further 
protection‟ variant differs from Option 1 (and so why the different level of review 
would be justifiable). Further, as both proposals still involve decision-making within a 
single administrative body, it would appear to remain essential to retain a full merits 
appeal before the CAT. Not only does it seem inappropriate to seek to parachute an 
(alien) EU model of judicial review into the UK system, which has over a number of 
years developed its own understood and carefully crafted distinction between full 
merits appeals and judicial review, but it has already been seen that, increasingly, 
doubt is being raised as to whether the EU level of judicial review is itself ECHR 
compliant.
112
 Whilst this uncertainty remains it would seem difficult and potentially 
inappropriate to introduce this approach into the UK system.
113
 If it is correct that 
these variants would continue to require review by means of a full appeal on the 
 
108
  Ibid, 5.38. 
109
  See the discussion of market and mergers cases below. 
110
  Consultation Document, 5.39. „However, the creation of the single authority offers the opportunity 
to build further on these improvements and to introduce the sort of second phase decision-making 
for antitrust that we currently have for mergers and markets-ie using a panel drawn from a pool of 
publicly appointed people with the appropriate authority, expertise and independence‟, L 
Carstensen, op cit n 29. It is not, however, clear why it would be necessary to alter the institutional 
design of the CMA‟s antitrust processes (e.g., by the insertion of investigatory and/or adjudicatory 
panels) simply to introduce further project management techniques and/or additional oversight of 
case management by senior personnel. 
111
  See e.g., Consultation Document, 5.39. 
112
  See nn 69 and 71 above and accompanying text. Indeed, there is a view that the ECtHR case-law in 
this area requires that the court „has the power to rehear the evidence or to substitute its own views 
to that of the administrative authority. Otherwise, there might never be a “possibility that the 
central issue would be determined by a tribunal that was independent of one of the parties to the 
dispute”.‟ A Andreangeli et al, op cit n 69 above, para 49 relying on Tsfayo v UK (2006), para 48. 
But contrast the view of the Government, Consultation Document, 5.41-5.43. 
113
  Even if the Government considers that EU case law might develop in response to concerns about 
Human Rights, Consultation Document, 5.43. See also e.g., L Carstensen, op cit n 29 („One view is 
that provided a sufficiently robust institutional design can be established, all appeals can be limited 
to JR. My own view is that this is unlikely and not necessarily even desirable. In the first place, 
there is an existing “merits” appeal system in relation to antitrust decisions which it would be hard 
to curtail. In any event, even an institutional design with “fairness” fully embedded may not satisfy 
ECHR requirements for a fair trial‟). 
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merits by a structurally independent judicial body, „it is hard to see how that would 
achieve any of the advantages in terms of efficiency and speed that would be 
sought‟.114 Indeed, all of the Option 2 proposals appear to add further procedural 
hurdles at the CMA stage without a clear case for reducing the rights of those affected 
by its decision to judicial review only.  
An Option 4? 
During the debate that the Consultation Document has provoked, there has been some 
discussion as to whether a further option should also be considered, of introducing a 
„split‟ procedure for antitrust cases. One suggestion is that cartel (and other „object‟) 
cases under Article 101 TFEU/Chapter I could be treated differently from other cases 
(such as „effects‟115 and dominance cases) – the former perhaps requiting a 
prosecutorial system, with the latter requiring a more inquisitorial, administrative 
system.  
Although this type of proposal may feature in some of the responses, it is not 
set out in the Consultation Document and does not yet seem to have been fully 
articulated on paper. Nonetheless, such an approach would appear, at first sight, to 
raise a number of considerable practical issues. First of all, it is well known that the 
dividing line between „object‟ and „effect‟ cases under Article 101/Chapter I is not a 
clearly defined one and the issue still provokes considerable litigation and discussion 
in the literature.
116
 Plainly, a regime requiring differing procedures for the different 
cases would require a bright line to be drawn between those cases. This may 
challenging in the light of the evolving case law in this area. Secondly, although 
objects and effects/dominance cases, respectively, require different types of analysis 
 
114
  B Allan, op cit n 27, 407 (but see n 110 above). In any event, it not clear that judicial review will 
always be shorter. „[I]t is incorrect that JR ... is necessarily light touch or speedy-and indeed where 
it results in a remittal the consequences for the end-to-end timeline of cases can be far more 
adverse than a merits appeal‟, see L Carstensen, op cit n 29.   
115
  „Conduct in the first sub-category [conduct prohibited by object] is subject to severe punitive 
sanctions; conduct in the second sub-category [arrangements which require a careful balancing of 
their benefits and detriments before their legality can be determined] will normally only attract 
non-punitive civil consequences (unenforceability, injunction and/or damages). Conduct in the first 
sub-category does not normally require sophisticated analysis of its economic implications; the 
essential issues concern a factual inquire into the parties‟ conduct. By contrast, the facts as to the 
parties‟ conduct in the second sub-category are normally clear and the issues turn upon the 
economic implications of those facts‟, B Allan, op cit n 27, 393. Both dominance and „effects‟ 
cases, although requiring detailed analysis of economic benefits and detriments, can, however, 
result in severe sanctions being imposed on a company found to be in breach, see e.g., OFT 
decision in Reckitt Benckiser, 13 April 2011 (fine of £10.2 million) and decisions of the European 
Commission in Intel 13 May 2009 (fine of €1.06 billion) and Visa 3 October 2007 (fine of €102 
million for refusing to admit Morgan Stanley to the Visa network). 
116
  See e.g., GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission (Cases C-501, 513, 515 & 519/06 P) 
[2009] ECR I-9291, Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd (BIDS) (Case 
C-209/07) [2008] ECR I-8637, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v Raad van beestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit (Case C-8/08) [2009] ECR I-4529, Pierre Fabre, (Case C-439/09) 
(judgment pending) and e.g., O Odudu, „Interpreting Article 81(1): object as subjective intention‟ 
(2001) 26 ELRev 60, Jones, A., 'Left behind by Modernisation? Restrictions by Object under 
Article 101(1)' (2010) European Competition Journal 649 and A Andreangeli, „From mobile 
phones to cattle: how the Court of Justice is reframing the approach to Article 101 (formerly 81 EC 
Treaty ) of the EU Treaty (2011) Word Competition 000. 
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(with the latter being more likely to require greater analysis of the economic 
implications of the conduct), both types of investigation may result in severe 
consequences for the investigated undertaking(s) and, in particular, the imposition of 
significant fines for violations. In the light of this, the exact rationale for wishing to 
operate such separate regimes for the different types of cases is not entirely clear.
117
 
Thirdly, there is already a recognition in the UK that hardcore „cartel‟ cases may be in 
a different category – this is the reason that a criminal cartel offence was introduced in 
2003. It might not seems justifiable, therefore, to draw a further distinction or 
subcategory of anticompetitive arrangements within antitrust cases.
118
.  
The Markets and Merger Regimes 
The Options 
In contrast to the antitrust enforcement system, the EA markets and merger provisions 
currently confer separate and independent roles on the OFT and CC respectively. 
Broadly, in markets cases the OFT conducts market study investigations (in some 
ways akin to a „phase 1‟ investigation process) and may make a market investigation 
reference (MIR) to the CC where it has grounds for suspecting that any „feature, or 
combination of features‟119 of a market prevents, restricts or distorts competition.  On 
a reference to it, the CC determines whether referred market features lead to an 
adverse effect on competition and, if so, what should be done to remedy or mitigate 
it.
120
 In merger cases, the OFT conducts Phase I reviews and has to determine whether 
to refer a relevant merger situation to the CC. Essentially it has to consider whether 
the merger may result in a substantial lessening of competition in the UK.
121
  It is the 
CC, however, which determines after a more in-depth Phase II review, whether or not 
the relevant merger situation will have an anticompetitive outcome and, if so, how to 
remedy, mitigate or prevent the adverse effect.
122
 In both scenarios, therefore, the 
OFT screens markets and mergers and, in cases requiring more detailed scrutiny, the 
CC investigates the issues further and takes final decisions (it thus combines 
investigatory and adjudicatory functions). The two phase procedure is designed to 
ensure that only more complex or potentially problematic cases are subjected to full 
phase 2 scrutiny and to guard against the risk of confirmation bias by providing for 
phase 2 decisions to be taken by an independent entity. Markets and merger decisions 
 
117
  See n 115 above. 
118
  In the US the important distinction between cartel and „other‟ antitrust cases is recognised by 
virtue of the fact that the former are prosecuted by the Department of Justice criminally, whilst 
other violations are only dealt with through civil proceedings. Fines can only be imposed in the 
context of criminal proceedings.  
119
  EA s 131(1). It can also accept undertakings in lieu of making a reference EA, s 154. A feature can 
be any aspect of market structure, any conduct of supplier(s) or acquirer(s) of goods or services or 
customers (s 131(2)). The Secretary of State can also make MIRs under EA, s 132.  
120
  EA, ss 159, 161 and Sched 8. MIR remedies are monitored by the OFT once in place. 
121
  The OFT can accept undertakings from the merging parties in lieu of a reference to the CC, EA s 
73. The Secretary of State plays a role in specified public interest cases, EA, s 58. 
122
   EA, ss 35, 36 and 41. Merger remedies are monitored by the OFT once in place.  
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are subject to review by the CAT, but unlike the full merits appeal for antitrust cases, 
the CAT applies judicial review principles.
123
 
The decision to merge the OFT and CC presents the question of whether this 
two stage procedure should be retained within the CMA, and if so how, and whether 
providing that the two stages should be conducted within the same institution has 
implications for the appeals process which should be conducted. For both markets and 
merger cases the Government presents a „base case‟ model (which remain largely 
unchanged in relation to decision-making although other process improvements might 
be introduced eg tighter statutory deadlines) and then makes other proposals based on 
some modification to that model. The Consultation Document considers that there is a 
broad spectrum of alternative potential decision-making structures and invites 
comments on them (these are described in tables 3 and 4 below as Option 2). It does 
not discuss change to the appeal structure or a potential „Option 3‟ for markets and 
merger cases, i.e., there is no proposal that these cases should be taken before the 
CAT or some other institutionally independent body for adjudication and final 
decision.
124
 
 
Table 3: Markets Options for Reform 
 Phase I Review Phase II Review Appeal 
Option 1 
(Base Model) 
Decision to initiate 
study and make MIR 
by executive board 
Investigatory panel made up of 
independent members from a 
list of panel members (full or 
part time), working closely 
with case team. Conducts 
investigation within guidance 
set by Supervisory Board and 
comes to own independent 
decision and determines 
remedies. 
Judicial Review 
before the CAT. 
Option 2 
(Possible 
Changes) 
Decision to initiate 
study and make MIR 
by executive board 
Possible changes: (i) some of 
phase I market study team 
continue to work on the Phase 
2 investigation (as part of 
larger team to avoid 
confirmatory bias); (ii) role of 
panel - should it move to being 
more adjudicatory in function; 
and (ii) should there be a role 
for the executive on the panel 
or some other way for 
executive to input into the 
case, whilst preserving 
independence of the decision-
taker. 
Judicial Review 
before the CAT. 
 
123
  EA, ss 179 and 120. This is „normal „judicial review as applied by the ordinary courts. Indeed, in 
BSkyB [2010] EWCA Civ 2, para 29 the Court of Appeal noted that the EA appeared to provide 
the only example of a situation in which a specialist tribunal has the duty of applying judicial 
review principles.  
124
  But see the view set out by B Allan, op cit n 27. 
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Table 4: Merger Options for Reform 
 Phase I Review Phase II Review Appeal 
Option 1 
(Base Model) 
Decision as to 
reference, clearance, 
undertakings in lieu to 
be undertaken by one 
or more senior 
members of the 
executive 
In depth investigation and final 
decision and remedies 
determination taken by panel 
made up of part time panel 
members working within the 
guidance set by the 
Supervisory Board. 
Judicial Review 
before the CAT. 
Option 2 
(Possible 
Changes) 
Decision as to 
reference, clearance, 
undertakings in lieu to 
be undertaken by one 
or more senior 
members of the 
executive 
Possible changes: (i) Phase 2 
decision to be made by an 
independent senior member of 
the executive (not previously 
involved in the case) - alone or 
in conjunction with a Non-
Executive Director or an 
independent panellist; (ii) 
retain panel as final decision-
maker but not as an 
investigatory panel - phase 2 
case team puts evidence before 
panel who makes final 
decision and on remedies; and 
(ii) investigation and 
adjudication by a panel made 
up of independent panellists 
with enhanced role for 
executive (case team from 
phase I flows into phase 2 as 
part of a larger team). 
Judicial Review 
before the CAT. 
 
Selecting an Option 
The options for change to the decision-making structures for markets and merger 
cases are not so clearly spelt out or developed in the Consultation Document as they 
are for antitrust cases. Essentially, however, the proposals amount to: 
 retaining very similar structures to the existing ones (recreating a Phase II 
investigation and decision-making panel within the CMA which conducts the 
Phase I review); 
 altering the Phase 2 panel structure (for example, who the members of the 
panel should be, whether there should be an executive on the panel and 
whether the panel or an individual (or individuals) should take the final 
decision);  
 having members of the Phase 1 team flow into, and participate as members of, 
a larger Phase 2 team;  
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 having the Phase 2 panel operate as decision-taker acting simply as an 
adjudicatory panel with no investigative powers. 
Both markets and merger cases appear to be „civil‟ cases within the meaning of 
Article 6 ECHR.
125
 Although therefore it may be correct that an initial decision may 
be adopted by an administrative body, the decision-making structure of the CMA still 
must ensure due process and an ECHR compatible right of appeal to an independent 
and impartial tribunal (full jurisdictional control within a reasonable period of 
time).
126
 Further, sight must not be lost of the serious consequences which result from 
an adverse finding in a markets or merger case. In merger cases, parties may be 
prohibited from completing a merger, ordered to reverse a merger or may only be 
permitted to complete it subject to onerous conditions. In addition, in market cases 
although market participants are not technically „punished‟ for violations in the same 
way as they may be punished for violating the antitrust provisions, extremely severe 
consequences can follow from an MIR.
127
 Indeed, the EA provides for, amongst other 
things, structural remedies so that an investigated firm can be ordered to divest a part, 
and potentially a significant part, of its business.
128
 For those investigated under the 
markets provisions therefore, the stakes may seem to be just as high as they are in 
antitrust investigations. Because of the high stakes and the potentially serious issues 
for those involved, the current UK model has provided for the institutional separation 
of initial investigations and „fresh‟ in-depth investigations.129 Indeed, this aspect of 
the UK regime has been regarded as one of its key strengths and is one of the factors 
which has contributed to its strong reputation internationally.
130
 
These issues appear to indicate that robust and impartial decision-making will be 
best served in any new markets and mergers regime, if the Phase 1 and Phase 2 
investigations within the CMA are kept separate, i.e., decision-making at each stage, 
and the staff supporting them, are kept independent so that there is no risk of 
confirmatory bias and so that phase 2 panels can complete impartial and in-depth 
 
125
  See e.g., Le Compte, Van Leuven and de Meyere v Belgium [1982] 4 EHRR 1 and D Waelbroeck 
and D Fosselard, „Should the decision-making power in EC Antitrust procedures be left to an 
independent judge? - The impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on EC Antitrust 
procedures‟ (1994) YEL 111, 124-125. „By contrast, decisions at phase 2 of the merger and 
markets regimes are unlikely to engage “criminal” rights under Article 6 as their aim is to restore a 
market to a competitive state (or prevent a planned merger that would create an uncompetitive 
state), rather than to deter and punish transgressions. Phase 2 mergers and markets decisions may 
engage the Article 6 ECHR “civil” protections insofar as they “determine civil rights and 
obligations”.‟ Consultation Document, Annex 1, 84. See also e.g., Case T-351/03, Schneider v 
Commission [2007] ECR II-2337, para 183. 
126
  Consultation Document, para 3.41. 
127
  Final orders are limited to matters set out in EA Sched 8, but there is no such constraint upon 
undertakings. 
128
  See e.g., CC, BAA Airports Market Investigation, 19 March 2009, as a result of which BAA was 
required to sell off Gatwick, Stansted and a Scottish airport. The avenues of challenge were 
exhausted when the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal from a judgment of the Court of 
Appeal upholding the CC‟s decision, see [2010] EWCA Civ 1097. 
129
  Although arguably it hard to sustain the idea that the CC is a fresh pair of eyes at the end of a two 
year investigation, see B Allan, op cit n 27.  
130
  Consultation Document, 4.1. 
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investigations. Consequently, it does not seem appropriate that any Phase 1 team 
members should „transfer over‟ and form part of a larger Phase 2 team or that a 
member of the executive board (involved in the Phase I decision) should play a role in 
Phase 2 decision-making.
131
 In addition, the UK system of merger control has long 
provided for inquisitorial review by a second-phase investigative body. The Reports 
of the CC, and its predecessor the MMC, set out the Commission‟s reasoning in some 
detail, whether or not the decision (or recommendation) is to clear or block a 
transaction. A decision to require the UK authorities to persuade an adjudicator (or a 
court) to grant an „injunction‟ to prevent a merger from completing (or to impose 
remedies in a market investigation) would represent a dramatic cultural change. 
Although such a requirement may well encourage high standards of evidence 
gathering and case management by the new CMA it would, again, require a profound 
change in skills and culture which may be difficult to achieve in the short term.
132
  
The discussion above might indicate, therefore that the base case models may be 
most suitable for markets and merger cases. There are a few difficulties with this 
conclusion, however. First, this solution may not make a significant difference to 
speed or efficiency in decision-taking that the Government desires (although this 
objective may be achieved through the separate proposals for shortening some 
statutory timetables
133
). In that context, in any phase II process there is a potential 
trade off between speed on the one hand and thoroughness and due process on the 
other. While most companies subject to a phase II merger or market investigation 
wish, at the time, for the competition agency to conduct its processes more quickly, 
few companies or practitioners are likely to welcome any reform that elevates speed 
for its own sake over opportunities to make their case fully, orally and in writing, or to 
provide evidence.
134
 Secondly, it seems, essentially, to recognise that the second 
review should be conducted by an entity with sufficient independence to genuinely 
look afresh at the case. These internal panels will not have the same degree of 
independence as those which already exist in the institutionally separate CC. Thirdly, 
the Consultation Document does not address the level of appeal or review which 
would be required by the new proposals in great detail.
135
 It simply states that it is 
 
131
  This would mean that the decision would essentially be adopted by an integrated decision-maker 
requiring greater scrutiny by a court with full merits jurisdiction. See also the view of B Allan, op 
cit n 27, 412. 
132
  Although several jurisdictions (e.g., the US and New Zealand) do adopt a judicial model for 
merger cases.  See also the view of B Allan, op cit n 27 (effective decision-maker does not 
necessarily require the support of its own investigatory and analytical resources). 
133
  See nn 32 and 33 above. These changes are not of course dependent on the merger of the OFT and 
CC. The creation of a single authority might, however, enable some streamlining measures „such 
as, eg, [in merger cases] a faster fast track to phase 2 and early phase 2 determination with 
remedies in appropriate cases‟, L Carstensen, op cit n 29.  
134
  See e.g. Consultation Document, 4.46. 
135
  It also does not discuss length of appeals. In merger cases it is of course of enormous importance 
that to be effective appeals should be heard within a reasonable time period. To date, however, the 
CAT has a good track record of providing quick and robust review of merger decisions, see e.g., 
Appendix 2 (merger reference are generally concluded end to end within 9.4 months (excluding 
appeals) and within 10.6 months (including appeals)) and National Audit Office Review of the 
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possible to structure the decision-making processes for mergers and market cases 
within the single CMA in such a way that the existing right of appeal on judicial 
review processes remain the appropriate means of ensuring that the decision-making 
process is ECHR compliant.
136
 There is no discussion, however, as to why judicial 
review is appropriate for these cases but not for antitrust cases where an integrated 
decision-maker engages in both investigation on the one hand and decision-making on 
the other.
137
 
Conclusions 
The Government has raised the issue of reform of the UK institutional architecture for 
competition law enforcement at a time when concern about the due process and 
fairness within the EU system is escalating. Now the debate has been opened in the 
UK, the Government should ensure that any changes it makes to the system respect 
undertakings' right to a fair trial and that the chosen decision-making structure is 
clearly (and not simply possibly) ECHR compliant. The current system provides 
checks and balances over and above those available at the EU level and the 
understandable desire for faster and more efficient decision-making structures should 
not be elevated to the extent that they water down the essential protections now 
provided. Designing a new system provides an opportunity to showcase best practice 
and to provide for decision-making structures that permit robust and thorough 
decision-making while respecting fundamental due process rights. 
The Government, consequently, has some difficult choices to make. The 
discussion above illustrates that there is a trade-off to be made between some of the 
Government's objectives: i.e., balancing the desire to increase speed in decision-
taking in competition cases through changes which can be implemented as soon as 
possible, with potential uncertainty and risk for momentum and the effectiveness of 
the regime that some of the options entail. With regard to antitrust enforcement, 
Option 2 does not seem a strong contender to bring about the changes the Government 
desires. All of the variants set out in Option 2 would impose a new structure within 
the CMA and may not be ECHR compliant without retaining full merits appeal before 
the CAT. They would therefore have limited impact to the speed and number of 
antitrust cases which could be brought and the structural changes envisaged would not 
be necessary for the introduction of case management measures designed to accelerate 
process. Whilst Option 1 is least likely to compromise momentum and the short-term 
effectiveness of the regime, the extent to which the CMA will be able to build upon 
operational reforms to substantially speed up and increase decision-taking is unclear. 
Option 3, in contrast, does appear to have the potential to speed up and increase 
decision-making in the long run. It is also clearly fully compliant with Article 6 
ECHR. The radical changes that its implementation would require, however, may 
 
UK‟s Competition Landscape, 22 March 2010, 5.7 (the relatively few merger appeals brought 
since the EA came into force have all been determined by the CAT in under 12 months, with four 
of the 12 cases being determined in less than one month).  
136
  Consultation Document, 10.43. 
137
  Especially as the Consultation Documents accepts that in „civil and in some non-criminal cases, 
where the requirements for an “independent and impartial” tribunal are not fully met by the first-
instance decision-taker, Article 6 can be satisfied if there is a right of appeal of the first instance 
decision before an independent and impartial tribunal that has “full jurisdiction”.‟ Ibid. 
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mean that there would be a reduction in enforcement for a period whilst the CMA and 
CAT adapt to their new roles and to the new procedures and processes involved.  
In the context of the market and mergers cases, the optimum solution may be 
to put in place a system for the CMA which retains as many features of the current 
system as possible. This would preserve the rigour and impartiality of the current 
system of „phase 2‟ merger and market investigations as far as possible within the 
new unitary body. Although there may be some (limited) additional scope to reduce 
time periods for market investigations through the introduction of tighter procedural 
deadlines, it is unclear whether any new structure would fundamentally alter the 
CMA's incentives to conduct more market investigations (even if that were considered 
to be desirable). In conclusion, the proposals in the Consultation Document present a 
complex and inter-related set of issues for debate. The consultation process presents 
an important opportunity for additional reflection on the issues before any final 
decision is taken on further fundamental reform of the UK's competition regime. 
